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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study investigates the economic consequences of financial misreporting arising from 
employee responses. Specifically, we examine two employee reactions: (1) withdrawing their 
human capital and (2) reducing holding of employer stock, in both misreporting period and post-
restatement period. We find an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee 
holding of employer stock in the post-restatement period (restatement effect) and some evidence 
that employees start to react in the period of misreporting (misreporting effect). We also find 
some evidence that the misreporting effect varies with employee tenure in the misreporting 
period and the restatement effect varies with the severity of misreporting in the post-restatement 
period. We further show that our results are not driven by labor demand, increased likelihood of 
executive turnover, declining stock prices, and internal control weakness disclosures, and are 
robust to a matched sample estimation. Overall, our study provides evidence of human capital 
costs of financial misreporting to misreporting firms, shedding new light on the negative 
consequences of accounting failures. 
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The Economic Consequences of Financial Misreporting: Evidence from  
Employee Responses 
 
1. Introduction 
Accounting information is used by a variety of stakeholders for decision making, and 
failure to report appropriately has significant negative consequences. A number of studies find 
that revelations of accounting problems trigger serious adverse responses from shareholders, 
debtholders, regulatory and law enforcement agencies, and managerial labor market (e.g., 
Anderson and Yohn 2002; Graham, Li, and Qiu 2008; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin 2008a; Desai, 
Hogan, and Wilkins 2006). Employees, on the other hand, are critical stakeholders who tie up 
their human capital with the firm. Anecdotal evidence from cases like Enron and WorldCom 
illustrates that employees suffer substantial losses from accounting improprieties of their 
employers such as losing their jobs and retirement wealth. Yet, little research has examined 
employees’ responses to firm financial misreporting. 
This study attempts to fill the void by investigating whether employees react to financial 
misreporting by withdrawing their human capital and decreasing holding of employer stock in 
their retirement plans. Employees voluntarily make costly investment in firm-specific human 
capital. If employees become reluctant to do so, they will leave the firm, which makes the firm 
experience an observable higher turnover rate. Employee turnover proves to be costly to a firm. 
According to the Society for Human Resource Management,1 turnover costs are estimated to be 
roughly 150% of the base salary of replaced employees.2 In addition, David and Brachet (2011) 
find that labor turnover plays a more significant role in organizational forgetting (i.e., the 
                                                            
1 Society for Human Resource Management is a professional human resources membership association, aiming at 
promoting the role of human resources as a profession.  
2 See https://cnmsocal.org/featured/true-cost-of-employee-turnover/. Turnover costs include (but are not limited to) 
(1) cost of searching and hiring (advertising, interviewing, hiring), (2) cost of onboarding a new person (training, 
management time), and (3) lost productivity. 
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depreciation of organizational knowledge) than skill depreciation, impairing firms' capabilities 
and competitiveness. Similarly, reduced employee holding of employer stock is also costly to the 
firm. Prior studies find that employee holding of company stock can benefit the company in 
certain ways such as increasing employee motivation and productivity (Kruse and Blasi 1995) 
and placing the stock in friendly hands as a form of takeover defense (Rauh 2006). Thus, 
studying the outcomes of financial misreporting from the employee perspective can shed new 
light on the costs of accounting failures.   
We examine employee reactive behaviors in the period of misreporting (i.e., while 
misreporting is still in progress), and the period after restatement announcement. As inside 
stakeholders, employees may have intimate information about the firm and be able to detect 
some signs of ongoing misreporting-prone activities (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales 2010; Call, 
Kedia, and Rajgopal 2016). Thus, some employees who sense the abnormalities may choose to 
respond before the misreporting is exposed. We refer to this as the misreporting effect. Because 
not all employees have the same level of knowledge about different activities and transactions in 
the firm and possess expertise to know the accounting and reporting implications, the eventual 
restatement announcement should provide additional and substantive information, prompting 
further employee actions. We refer to this as the restatement effect. 
We follow Carter and Lynch (2004), Babenko and Sen (2014), and Phua, Tham, and Wei 
(2018) and gauge employee turnover as stock options forfeiture rate because options forfeitures 
typically occur upon employee departure from the firm. Based on restatements announced 
between 2007 and 2015, our within-sample analyses show a significant increase in employee 
turnover in the post-restatement period. We also find some evidence that employee turnover 
starts to increase in the misreporting period. For economic significance, accounting restatements 
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give rise to an increase of 13.04 percent and 29.57 percent in employee turnover in the 
misreporting period and the post-restatement period, respectively, relative to the pre-
misreporting period. The effects are incremental to what can be explained by changing firm 
characteristics, activities related to labor demand, and industry and time (year) trend.  
Misreporting varies in nature and differs in outcome. More serious misstatements are 
found to have greater adverse effects than less serious ones (Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008). In 
the context of employee turnover, we do find some evidence of differential reactions in the post-
restatement period to allegedly more severe misstatements although we fail to find such evidence 
in the misreporting period, suggesting that employees in general face uncertainty and challenge 
in assessing the severity of in-progress misreporting. We also examine whether the documented 
relation between misreporting and employee turnover varies with the length of employee tenure 
with the firm. Misreporting firms with long-tenure employees who have better knowledge about 
the firms should have a more salient increase in employee turnover in the misreporting period. 
We find some evidence consistent with this implication.  
We conduct a variety of robustness checks to further validate our inferences. First, one 
concern is that that the misreporting (restatement) effect may be confounded by the labor 
demand. In the main regressions, we control for concurrent changes in firm behavior that may 
alter the firm's demand for labor. To further address this concern, we perform three subsample 
analyses based on (1) firing costs, (2) employee bargaining power, and (3) business restructuring. 
If the labor demand drives our results, we should observe a stronger effect when firing costs are 
lower, employees have weaker bargaining power, and firms experience business restructuring. 
We fail to find supportive evidence. Second, restatement announcement leads to a higher 
likelihood of executive turnover (e.g., Desai et al. 2006), which may artificially inflate the 
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estimated increase in employee turnover. We control for the impact of executive turnover and 
find that our results capture the rank-and-file employee turnover. Third, to address the concern 
that our results are driven by the employee turnover measure unduly capturing expired options 
due to declining stock prices, we (1) exclude restatements announced during the 2007 financial 
crisis and (2) examine whether the restatement effect depends on stock price. We find that the 
misreporting (restatement) effect is independent of the stock price effect. Fourth, it is possible 
that the disclosures of internal control weaknesses (ICWs) may signal potential accounting 
problems and prompt employees to leave in the misreporting period. We find that employee 
separation in the misreporting period is not driven by ICW disclosures, indicating that employees 
make turnover decisions based on information not confined to ICW disclosures. Lastly, our 
results continue to hold for an industry-, size-, and firm age-matched sample, suggesting that the 
misreporting and restatement effect on employee turnover is not an artifact of changes in 
macroeconomic conditions.  
As another employee reaction, we follow Bova, Dou, and Hope (2015) and Bova, Kolev, 
Thomas, and Zhang (2014) and measure employee holding of employer stock as the dollar value 
of employer stock held in four defined contribution plans that allow direct investment in 
employer stock divided by the number of employees. The empirical results on the reactive 
changes in employee investment in employer stock to financial misreporting almost mirror what 
we have documented with regard to employee turnover: We find that employees dump employer 
stock from their retirement plans after misreporting is exposed and they start to do so even when 
misreporting is in progress; consistent with the notion that restatement announcements provide 
additional and substantive information and employees with long tenure with the firms have better 
knowledge of on-going misreporting, we find some evidence that the severe types of financial 
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misreporting induce a greater reduction in employee holding of employer stock after restatement 
announcement, and that employees having long tenure with the firm are more likely to reduce 
their holding of employer stock in the misreporting period. We also conduct several robustness 
checks to address (1) the stock price effect, (2) the ICWs disclosure effect, and (3) the effect of 
changing macroeconomic conditions. Our overall findings indicate that financial misreporting 
induces negative employee responses, which constitutes substantial costs to misreporting firms.  
Our research makes three contributions to the literature. First, it adds to the literature that 
studies the economic consequences of restatements by documenting (1) new negative outcomes 
arising from responses of employees, a critical production factor, and (2) employees reacting to 
misreporting even before the problem is exposed, as compared with prior studies that mostly 
focus on external stakeholders' reactions to the public announcement of restatements. The human 
capital costs of financial misreporting, largely neglected in prior literature, indicate that 
accounting problems have adverse implications for corporate human capital retention and 
development. In this sense, our findings shed new light on the fact that shareholder wealth losses 
from restatements far exceed direct cash outlays (Karpoff et al. 2008a).  
Second, our study complements the labor economics literature that examines the 
determining factors, such as "compensating differentials," for employee loyalty and commitment 
(Hamermesh and Wolfe 1990; Topel 1984) by showing that financial misreporting impairs 
employees' sense of belonging and commitment. The findings help further our understanding of 
the link between accounting and other corporate functions. 
Lastly, we extend the research that examines employee reactions to corporate misdeeds 
by blowing the whistle (Dyck et al. 2010; Call et al. 2016). Our results shed more general light 
on the employee reactions to misreporting before it is uncovered. While whistle blowing is a 
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relatively rare and unique way to bring corporate frauds to light, our findings indicate that an 
increased employee turnover rate and decreased employee ownership may serve as an observable 
signal of in-progress misreporting. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Related Literature 
Prior literature finds that financial misreporting induces negative responses from various 
stakeholders, and thus incurs substantial costs to misreporting firms. From the perspective of 
shareholders, prior studies find that accounting restatements induce significant stock price drops 
and firm value losses (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004; 
Karpoff et al. 2008a), higher costs of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004), decline in the 
information content of earnings (Chen, Cheng, and Lo 2013), and reduced attractiveness in the 
market for corporate control (Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2015). From a debtholders' perspective, 
Graham et al. (2008) report a substantial increase in loan costs after restatement announcement, 
and Chen (2016) finds that loan spreads start to increase even during the misreporting period. 
From the perspective of regulatory and law enforcement agencies, misreporting firms are found 
to incur substantial cash outlays on fines and penalties (Karpoff et al. 2008a) and face a higher 
likelihood of litigation (Palmrose and Scholz 2004). From a managerial labor market perspective, 
several studies find a higher likelihood of executive turnover and poor subsequent employment 
prospects of the involved managers and directors (Srinivasan 2005; Desai et al. 2006; Karpoff, 
Lee, and Martin 2008b).  
Employees are critical stakeholders whose efforts and commitments are crucial to the 
firm's success. Karpoff et al. (2008a) infer that a significant portion of value losses from 
financial misrepresentation stems from reduced value of implicit claims with non-financial 
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stakeholders. Yet, there is little direct evidence on whether and how financial misreporting 
induces negative responses from non-financial stakeholders especially employees. The lack of 
evidence makes our understanding of the costs of financial misreporting to firms incomplete. 
This study thus focus on employees’ responses to employers’ financial misreporting. 
Kedia and Philippon (2009) study firm actions and find that firms overinvest during 
periods of misreporting and shed labor and capital after misreporting is detected. They document 
a net increase in the number of employees during the misreporting period and a net drop in the 
post-restatement period. Their findings imply that hires exceed exits during the misreporting 
period whereas exits exceed hires in the post-restatement period, but do not inform the dynamics 
of exits. We are interested in employee separation arising from the labor supply effect, and also 
examine employee reaction to financial misreporting in terms of their investment decision. 
Hypotheses  
Employees tie up their human capital and retirement wealth with the firm. Thus, we study 
their responses to financial misreporting from two perspectives: (1) withdrawing human capital 
from the firm and (2) reducing holding of company stock in their retirement plans. Given that 
employees are inside stakeholders who have private access to firm information, we study their 
reactions in the misreporting period in addition to the period after restatement announcement. 
We examine temporal changes in employee turnover and employee holding of employer 
stock along three distinct periods for misreporting firms. The misreporting period is defined as 
fiscal years in which a firm misreports its financial statements (based on the starting and ending 
dates of misreporting).3 We define the pre-misreporting period as the three years preceding the 
start year of the misreporting period. Since the pre-misreporting period serves as the benchmark 
period, we use the three-year window to smooth possible fluctuations of our measures of 
                                                            
3 The length of misreporting periods varies across firms, with a mean value of two years for our sample firms. 
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employee reactions. The post-restatement period is defined as the year after the restatement 
announcement year. We choose this short window because it would be difficult to attribute 
changes in employee turnover and employee ownership to a restatement if they are measured too 
far away from the announcement date (Desai et al. 2006).  
We extract the misreporting and restatement effects by comparing the latter two periods 
with the baseline pre-misreporting period. Studying dynamics of employee responses has two 
major benefits. First, using a misreporting firm as its own control allows us to control for any 
time-invariant unobservable characteristics of misreporting firms. Second, obtaining effects from 
multiple periods can help us isolate specific economic mechanisms. For example, the increased 
employee turnover in the misreporting period cannot be explained by the demand side story.  
Financial Misreporting and Employee Turnover 
Employees in misreporting firms can contract their labor supply for several reasons. First, 
misreporting causes employees to doubt the firm's ability to fulfill the implicit claims about 
working conditions, future prospects, and job security (Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Bowen, 
DuCharme, and Shores 1995) and the ability to share risks (Baily 1974; Guiso, Pistaferri, and 
Schivardi 2005).4 The cases of Enron and WorldCom illustrate that accounting misconduct can 
force a firm out of business or even lead to its demise. Second, financial misreporting impairs the 
credibility of reporting, which increases employees’ uncertainty about the value of employee-
employer match (Jovanovic 1979). Lastly, misreporting, especially the fraudulent type, may 
                                                            
4 Rational employees may expect various negative outcomes of misreporting on the firm's operation, financial 
condition, and viability. Accounting improprieties, once revealed, can incur substantial cash outlays on legal costs, 
fines, and penalties (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Karpoff et al. 2008a), increase financing costs (Graham et al. 2008; 
Hribar and Jenkins 2004), and lead to unfavorable trade terms from suppliers and customers (Karpoff et al. 2008a). 
Financial misreporting can also increase the cost of operations by diverting resources and managers' time to the 
investigation and forcing the firm to implement new monitoring and control policies. 
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contradict employees’ moral standards and ethical values, breeding distrust on the management 
and the firm and hurting employees’ sense of belonging and affiliation.  
As inside stakeholders, employees may catch some signs of misreporting in progress 
through their participation in daily operations, direct observation of management decisions, 
ongoing tracking of transaction patterns, and even informal conversations with coworkers. 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) find that misreporting often begins small and snowballs, and Dyck 
et al. (2010) show that employees, due to their access to inside information and low cost of 
collecting information about the firm, uncover most misreporting cases of accounting-related 
shareholder lawsuits compared with external monitors. Call et al. (2016) find that executives 
grant greater options to rank-and-file employees during misreporting periods to discourage them 
from exposing the misconduct, suggesting that employees have some clues about misreporting. 
The awareness of misreporting may induce employees to depart during the misreporting period. 
Typical employees at a company are unlikely to know about all the different activities 
and transactions; even if some employees know a lot about the firm, they still need expertise to 
grasp the accounting and reporting implications. The eventual restatement announcement should 
present additional and substantive information to employees and further prompts employees to 
part with the company. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Employee turnover increases during the misreporting period relative to the pre-
misreporting period. 
 
H1b: Employee turnover increases during the post-restatement period relative to the pre-
misreporting period. 
 
Financial Misreporting and Employee Holding of Employer Stock 
On the one hand, employee holding of company stock can benefit the company in certain 
ways such as increasing employee motivation and productivity (Kruse and Blasi 1995) and 
10 
 
placing the stock in friendly hands as a form of takeover defense (Rauh 2006). On the other 
hand, investing in employer stock is costly for employees due to insufficient diversification and 
their human capital being tied up with the company (Benartzi, Thaler, Utkus, and Sunstein 
2007). Meulbroek (2005) estimates that employees can lose roughly 50 percent of the value of 
their portfolios with their employer stock relative to well-diversified portfolios after accounting 
for risk (Benartzi et al. 2007). Many factors can explain employees' investment in employer 
stock. One such factor is employee trust in and commitment to the company and management. 
When their confidence in the credibility of the employer's financial information is eroded and 
doubt over the company’s future prospects arises, we expect employees to reduce holding of 
employer stock in their retirement benefit accounts. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Employees reduce their holding of employer stock during the misreporting period 
relative to the pre-misreporting period. 
 
H2b: Employees reduce their holding of employer stock during the post-restatement period 
relative to the pre-misreporting period. 
 
III. FINANCIAL MISREPORTING AND EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 
Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample selection begins with 5,203 non-reliance restatements with filing year (fiscal 
year) between 2007 and 2015 in Audit Analytics for firms that are also covered in Compustat. 
The non-reliance restatements are those that undermine previous and/or current financial 
statements due to material accounting misrepresentation. The sample period for employee 
turnover analysis starts in 2007 as data on options cancellations in Compustat (used to measure 
employee turnover) are only available from 2004 onward and we need three-year data for the 
pre-misreporting period. To avoid any overlap of the three different periods, we exclude 
restatements whose misreporting beginning date is less than five year after the ending date of a 
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previous misstatement,5 which reduces the number of restatements to 2,658. We further require 
each misreporting firm to have necessary data from Compustat and CRSP on main variables 
(employee turnover measure, firm size, leverage, market-to-book, return on assets, capital 
expenditure, sales growth, firm age, stock return, employee growth, and asset growth) across all 
three periods. This leads to the final sample of 374 restatements, with 2,109 firm-year 
observations (988 observations in the pre-misreporting period, 747 in the misreporting period, 
and 374 in the post-restatement period).   
Measuring Employee Turnover  
Following prior studies (e.g., Phua et al. 2018; Carter and Lynch 2004; Babenko and Sen 
2014), we estimate the likelihood of employee departure from the firm using stock options 
forfeiture rate. Options forfeitures typically occur upon employee separation from the firm (i.e., 
employees forfeit all unvested options and vested underwater options). Specifically, we calculate 
the rate (EmployeeTurnover) as the number of stock options cancellations, forfeitures, and 
expirations (optca from Compustat since 2004) divided by the number of non-executive 
employee stock options outstanding (i.e., the difference between total number of stock options 
outstanding [optosey from Compustat] and sum of the number of exercisable and non-exercisable 
executive stock options outstanding [opt_unex_exer_num plus opt_unex_unexer_num from 
ExecuComp]) in the beginning of the year.  
This options-based measure of employee turnover may suffer from measurement noise. 
Thus we try different ways to address this issue.6 First, as the options cancellations variable in 
Compustat covers both executives and rank-and-file employees, one concern is that our measure 
                                                            
5 Using a similar within-sample analysis, Chen (2016) retains the first restatement of each firm during its sample 
period to avoid overlap of pre-misreporting period and misreporting period.     
6 To assess the reasonableness of using the options-based measure as a proxy for overall employee turnover, Carter 
and Lynch (2004) relate the measure to the industry-level employee turnover data provided by the Saratoga Institute 
and find that the correlation is 0.66. 
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may primarily capture executive turnover because executives show a higher turnover rate after 
restatements in our setting. However, take note that unlike rank-and-file employees, executives 
generally can cliff vest their options when leaving the company.7 For example, when Zynga 
Inc.'s CEO Don Mattrick resigned, the company accelerated the vesting of restricted stocks and 
unvested options for him.8,9 Therefore, the influence of executive turnover on our measure of 
employee turnover should be limited. We also analyze options grants and find that 67.14% of 
options outstanding are held by non-executive employees, suggesting our measure is heavily 
influenced by non-executive employee turnover. In our empirical analyses, we design specific 
tests to further address the concern by (1) controlling for executive turnover and (2) interacting 
executive turnover with Misreporting and PostRestatement, the two indicator variables denoting 
the misreporting and post-restatement period, respectively.       
Second, departing employees typically forfeit unvested options and underwater vested 
options, but the Compustat item optca is an aggregate of cancelled, forfeited, and expired stock 
options. A natural concern is that our employee turnover measure may pick up stock options 
expiries due to stock price decline. However, employee options normally have a 10-year life and 
vest over 1-3 years. Prior studies find that non-executive employees, due to risk aversion and 
liquidity needs, often exercise options years before expiration (e.g., Huddart and Lang 1996; 
Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace 2019). Because of employees' preferences for early exercise, it 
                                                            
7 Contractually, executives can only get their exit benefits when employment is terminated by the company without 
cause, or by the executives “for good reason.” In practice, it is rare for executives to be fired for cause. San 
Francisco-based analytics startup Quid searched millions of stories in news articles, blogs and news releases and 
found that the phrase “CEO is fired” or variations of it appeared in 1,786 stories, versus 32,508 stories for “CEO 
resigns.” Please see https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/CEOs-never-get-fired-they-pursue-other-
7948646.php?psid=4g79r. 
8Please see https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ceos-get-paid-even-when-they-quit-because-they-can-2015-04-13. 
9 This practice is widely used by U.S. public companies for legal and strategic reasons such as (1) avoiding messy 
parting and prolonged legal fights between the company and executives, (2) protecting the company's intellectual 
property, and (3) avoiding public scrutiny and reputation damage in the managerial labor market. 
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is more likely for optca to capture forfeited than expired employee options. In our empirical 
study, we further address this noise by (1) excluding restatements announced during the 2007 
financial crisis and (2) examining whether the relation between employee turnover and 
misreporting (restatement) depends on stock price performance.  
Lastly, to address concerns that employee retirement may induce noise in our measure, 
we follow Phua et al. (2018) and include firm age in our regression analyses to proxy workforce 
age. To validate the employee turnover measure, we run correlations between EmployeeTurnover 
and three employment growth measures and current year stock return.  The three employment 
growth measures are: change in the number of employees scaled by total assets (ΔEMP/ATt-1), 
employee growth rate (ΔEMP/EMPt-1), and change in the number of employees scaled by 
property, plant, and equipment (ΔEMP/PPENTt-1). Two of the measures are scaled by total assets 
and physical assets respectively to ensure that employment change is not simply a manifestation 
of across-the-board change in activity. As reported in Panel B of Table 1, EmployeeTurnover is 
positively and highly significantly correlated with all the three employment growth measures, 
suggesting the employee turnover measure captures some extent of change in the level of 
employment. Because employee change is the net result of hires and exits and 
EmployeeTurnover measures exits, we do not expect the two constructs to be perfectly 
correlated. We also find that the correlation between EmployeeTurnover and current year stock 
return is not statistically significant, suggesting that the employee turnover measure is not an 
artifact of expired stock options arising from declining stock prices.   
Regression Model and Descriptive Statistics 
Employing a within-sample temporal change design, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
to estimate the following regression model: 
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EmployeeTurnovert  = β0 + β1*Misreportingt + β2*PostRestatementt + β3*SIZEt-1  
                                       + β4*Leveraget-1 + β5*MTBt-1 + β6*ROAt-1 + β7*R&Dt-1 + β8*Capext-1 
                                       + β9*SalesGrowtht-1 + β10* Log(AGEt-1) + β11*StockReturnt-1  
                                       + β12*StockReturnt + β13*SalesGrowtht + β14*EmployeeGrowtht  
                                       + β15*AssetGrowtht + β16*PPENTGrowtht  + Industry fixed effects  
                                       + Year fixed effects + ϵt,                                                                                              (1) 
 
where Misreporting and PostRestatement denote the misreporting and post-restatement period, 
respectively (equal to 1 for the corresponding period and 0 otherwise). The pre-misreporting 
period serves as the default period. Thus, β1 captures change in EmployeeTurnover from the pre-
misreporting to the misreporting period, and β2 from the pre-misreporting to the post-restatement 
period. If employees catch signs of misreporting and react accordingly, we expect β1 to be 
positive and significant. If employees react to restatement announcement, we expect the same for 
β2. Because we use a misreporting firm as its own control, the estimated misreporting effect (β1) 
and restatement effect (β2) are less likely to be confounded by time-invariant omitted variables.  
We include in the regression a set of firm characteristics that may affect employee 
turnover. We control for firm size (SIZE), as large firms provide higher job security and should 
have a lower employee turnover rate (Lane, Isaac, and Stevens 1996). Leverage is positively 
related to bankruptcy risk and thus unemployment risk (Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 2013). 
We include leverage ratio (Leverage) to account for the impact of financing on employment risk. 
Employees are less inclined to leave companies with superior accounting performance and 
growth options, and we include return on assets (ROA) and market-to-book ratio (MTB) to 
account for this effect. We also include R&D expenditure (R&D), capital investment (Capex), 
and sales growth (SalesGrowth) to account for the effect of business expansion on employee 
turnover. Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) find that young firms tend to have younger workers, and 
these firms should have lower retirement. We include firm age (Log[AGE]) to address 
measurement noise of employee turnover introduced by retirement. Given our focus on the labor 
15 
 
supply effect, we relate employee turnover to these firm features in the most recent year to avoid 
forward-looking bias. We further include past and current year stock returns (StockReturn) 
because stock performance may affect employees' employment decision.  
Prior studies find that firms overinvest during periods of misreporting and shed labor and 
capital after misreporting is detected (Kedia and Philippon 2009; McNichols and Stubben 2008). 
To account for this demand-side effect, we control for concurrent changes in firm behavior that 
may alter the firm's demand for labor. Since slow sales growth, employee downsizing, and 
reduced firm scale may cause shedding labor, we control for concurrent changes in sales growth 
(SalesGrowtht), employment growth (ΔEMP/ATt-1), total assets growth (AssetsGrowtht), and 
physical assets growth (PPENTGrowtht). We scale employment change by total assets to ensure 
that employment cuts are not simply a manifestation of across-the-board cutbacks in activity.  
Lastly, we include industry fixed effects to account for industry heterogeneity in 
employee turnover and year fixed effects to address concerns that temporal changes in employee 
turnover may just reflect changing macroeconomic situation. To avoid the undue influence of 
outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the firm level to account for serial correlations within a firm across 
years. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix 1.    
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in Equation (1). The mean 
(median) employee turnover is 0.131 (0.062), which is comparable to Phua et al. (2018). Panel A 
of Figure 1 plots the mean value of EmployeeTurnover in the three periods with 0.115 in the pre-
misreporting period and up to 0.135 and 0.163 in the misreporting and the post-restatement 
period, respectively. The mean value of Misreporting and PostStatement indicates that the 
number of observations in the misreporting and post-restatement period accounts for 35.4 and 
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17.7 percent of total observations, respectively. Average firm size is 7.733, leverage ratio 0.232, 
market-to-book ratio 1.762, return on assets 0.034, the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets 
0.025, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets 0.043, annual sales growth rate 0.083, firm 
age 27.19, and annual stock return 0.026. Employee growth is 0.015 percent of total assets, and 
the growth for total assets and for property, plant and equipment is 8.5 percent and 8.6 percent, 
respectively.   
Empirical Results 
We estimate Equation (1) with controls for firm characteristics, labor demand factors, 
industry and year fixed effects and report the results in Table 2. The coefficient on Misreporting 
is positive and marginally significant, providing some evidence that employees react to 
misreporting in-progress by exiting the company before it becomes known to the public. In terms 
of economic significance, the coefficient of 0.013 means a 13.04 percent increase in employee 
turnover in the misreporting period relative to the pre-misreporting period.10 The coefficient on 
PostRestatement is also positive and significant (0.034, p-value = 0.029) and the estimate implies 
a 29.57 percent (0.034/0.115) increase in employee turnover after restatement announcement, 
which is economically large and represents a substantial cost to misreporting firms, a 
phenomenon not documented in prior literature. The overall results suggest that some employees 
may smell ongoing misreporting and react by separating from the firm, and that public 
restatement announcement prompts more employee departures.11  
                                                            
10 The coefficient on Misreporting divided by the mean value of EmployeeTurnover in the pre-misreporting period 
(0.013/0.115 = 13.04%). 
11 Call et al. (2016) find that executives grant more options to rank-and-file employees during misreporting periods. 
Our findings should not be driven by this observation as employee options normally have a 10-year life and vest 
over 1-3 years while the average misreporting period is 2 years. 
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As for the control variables, the coefficients are largely consistent with the predictions. 
Larger firms are found to have lower employee turnover, whereas more levered firms have 
higher turnover. Employees are less likely to leave firms with superior accounting performance 
and great growth potential. Although employee turnover is negatively related to both past and 
current stock returns, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on past stock 
returns is greater relative to current year stock returns. The association with past stock returns 
likely captures employees' choices for staying with good performance firms while the association 
with current year stock returns can be due to both employees' choices and the mechanical 
correlation between the employee turnover measure and current stock returns. Our results seem 
to suggest that the employee choice effect dominates. We find that the coefficients on all four 
variables that capture the labor demand are negative although only two of them are significant.  
Financial misreporting varies in nature and differs in outcome. Prior studies find that 
more serious misreporting such as accounting irregularities has greater adverse effects than less 
serious misreporting such as accounting errors (Hennes et al. 2008). Because accounting frauds 
represent management's intentional acts and more severe misreporting is more likely targeted by 
the SEC, we classify as severe cases the misstatements that are identified by Audit Analytics as 
frauds or have been investigated by the SEC, and denote them by an indicator, SevereRes. To test 
whether the severe types of misreporting induce a greater increase in employee turnover, we add 
to Equation (1) SevereRes and its interaction terms with Misreporting and PostRestatement and 
report the estimated results in Table 3.12 The results suggest that employees react to all types of 
misreporting, as the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement remain positive and 
significant. Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term SevereRes*PostRestatement is 
                                                            
12 All control variables in Equation (1) are included in the regression, but we do not report their coefficients for 
brevity. 
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positive and marginally significant but insignificant on SevereRes*Misreporting, suggesting that 
employees may not be able to tell the severity of misreporting during the misreporting period, 
but come to grips with the seriousness after restatement announcement. 
We next perform a subsample analysis to inquire whether employee tenure with the firm 
affects the association between employee turnover and misreporting during the misreporting 
period. The analysis is motivated by the idea that employees having longer tenure with a firm 
tend to be more informed about, and thus more sensitive to, a firm's misreporting before it is 
publicly revealed, so that the association between employee turnover and misreporting should be 
stronger. Given the lack of data on employee tenure for individual firms, we use firm age to 
proxy employee tenure on the assumption that average employees in an older firm are likely to 
be with the firm for a longer time than in a younger firm. 
We partition the sample into two subsamples based on firm age in the year before the 
misreporting period. We estimate Equation (1) separately for the two subsamples and report the 
results in Table 4. The coefficient on Misreporting is only significant for the long employee 
tenure subsample, consistent with our expectation. Moreover, its magnitude is greater than that 
for the short employee tenure subsample and the difference is statistically significant. We do not 
observe the difference in the coefficient on PostRestatement between the two subsamples, 
indicating little effect of employee tenure after misreporting is exposed.    
Robustness Checks 
Labor Demand Effect 
Kedia and Philippon (2009) find a net increase in the number of employees during the 
misreporting period and a net drop in the post-restatement period, implying that hires exceed 
exits in the former period and the trend reverses in the latter period, but they do not inform 
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whether exits are greater during the misreporting and post-restatement period relative to the pre-
misreporting period. We have controlled for various factors that are related to the labor demand 
in the main regressions. In this section, we conduct three analyses to further address the concern 
that the misreporting (restatement) effect may be confounded by the labor demand.  
The first test involves a subsample analysis based on firing costs. Higher firing costs will 
make firms more cautious in laying off employees. If the increase in employee turnover after 
restatements is largely driven by the demand effect, the relation between employee turnover and 
restatement should be stronger when firing costs are lower. We follow prior studies and use 
state-level recognition of wrongful discharge laws (WDLs) to measure the costs of dismissing 
workers (e.g., Serfling 2016). We create an index by summing three distinct dummy variables for 
each of the three WDL exceptions (the good faith exception, the implied contract exception, and 
the public policy exception) and partition the sample into high and low firing cost subsamples 
based on the median value of the index. We estimate Equation (1) separately for the two 
subsamples and report the results in Panel A of Table 5. We fail to observe evidence that the 
effect of misreporting (restatement) on employee turnover is weaker in the high firing costs 
subsample, which is inconsistent with the labor demand explanation.        
We run the second test by cutting the sample based on employee bargaining power. 
Labor union is found to provide workers greater bargaining power than any other factors (e.g., 
Bova et al. 2015). If higher employee turnover is the result of cutback on labor, we should 
observe a weaker relation between employee turnover and misreporting (restatement) in the 
situation of greater union coverage. We collect industry unionization data from the Union 
Membership and Coverage Database (UMCD). The database reports unionization rates each year 
for the three-digit Census Industry Classification (CIC) industries in the period 1983-2017. We 
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match the three-digit CIC codes to the six-digit NAICS codes in Compustat. We split the sample 
into the high and low bargaining power subsamples based on the median value of unionization 
rate. We estimate Equation (1) separately for the two subsamples and report the estimated results 
in Panel B of Table 5. As well, we fail to find a weaker effect of misreporting (restatement) in 
the high bargaining power subsample.       
 Our last test takes advantage of firm restructuring activities. A firm tends to reshuffle its 
labor force when experiencing business restructuring. If the labor demand effect dominates, we 
should observe a stronger relation between employee turnover and misreporting (restatement) 
when a firm restructures its business. We treat a firm experiencing restructuring if item rcp or 
rca from Computat is nonzero. We estimate Equation (1) separately for restructuring firms and 
non-restructuring firms and report the estimated results in Panel C of Table 5. Again, we fail to 
find evidence consistent with the labor demand effect. 
Impact of Executive Turnover 
Prior studies document a higher likelihood of executive turnover following restatement 
announcement (e.g., Desai et al. 2006). This phenomenon can affect the association between 
employee turnover and restatement in several different ways. On the one hand, firing incumbent 
managers demonstrates restating firm's resolve to redress governance problems, which may 
boost employee confidence in the firm's future prospects, leading to a lower employee turnover. 
This will bias against us finding a positive relation between restatement and employee turnover. 
On the other hand, new executives may restructure the business and shed current labor, causing a 
positive relation between restatement and employee turnover. This demand side explanation has 
been addressed in the above section. In addition, if departing executives forfeit their options (as 
stated earlier, this does not typically happen), the value of our employee turnover measure may 
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be inflated, resulting in a mechanical positive relation between restatement and employee 
turnover. 
To account for possible effects of executive turnover, we conduct two analyses by (1) 
controlling for executive turnover and (2) interacting executive turnover with Misreporting and 
PostRestatement. We obtain data on CEO/CFO turnover from the ExecuComp database and 
identify 482 firm-years with CEO or CFO turnover, among which 110 occur in the first year of 
restatement announcement. The 30 percent of restating firms that experience CEO/CFO turnover 
is comparable to prior studies (e.g., Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 2015).13 Since CEO turnover is 
generally accompanied by other executive turnover (Fee and Hadlock 2004), an indicator of 
CEO/CFO turnover should largely capture the turnover of other executives.  
We first add an indicator variable, ExeTurnover, to the regression. Untabulated results 
show that its coefficient is positive, consistent with executive turnover contributing to the overall 
employee turnover, and that the coefficients on the two variables of interest (Misreporting and 
PostRestatement) remain largely unchanged. We then conduct a cross-sectional analysis to test 
whether the misreporting (restatement) effect is stronger when firms have executive turnover. As 
shown in Panel D, Table 5, the coefficients on the interaction terms (ExcTurnover*Misreporting 
and ExcTurnover*PostRestatement) are not statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of 
financial misreporting on employee turnover is not an artifact of executive turnover.         
Stock Price Effect 
If the employee turnover measure unduly captures expired options due to declining stock 
prices post-restatement, we may observe a mechanical relation between employee turnover and 
restatement. We have discussed earlier that this is less of a concern given that employees tend to 
                                                            
13 The number of misreporting firms that have CEO/CFO turnover divided by the total number of misreporting firms 
(110/374=0.30). 
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exercise their options well ahead of expiration date. We have also shown above an insignificant 
or weak correlation between the employee turnover measure and current year stock return. In this 
subsection, we further address this issue by conducting two tests. First, we exclude restatements 
announced during the 2007 financial crisis (2007-2009) and re-estimate Equation (1). As shown 
in Panel E of Table 5, the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement remain largely 
unchanged, suggesting that the market-wide shock to stock prices does not drive our results. 
Second, we examine whether the restatement effect on employee turnover depends on 
stock price. To facilitate interpretation, we create an indicator variable, LowStockPrc, based on 
the median value of current year stock return with a value of one denoting lower-than-median 
return. We interact LowStockPrc with Misreporting and PostRestatement. As shown in Panel F 
of Table 5, the coefficient on PostRestatement remains positive and significant, and the 
coefficient on the interaction term with LowStockPrc is marginally significant, suggesting that 
declining stock prices do not subsume the restatement effect. In contrast, the coefficients on both 
Misreporting and the interaction term with LowStockPrc*Misreporting are not significant. The 
overall results suggest that the restatement effect is not an artifact of declining stock prices.  
Internal Control Weakness Disclosures 
The existence of ICWs indicates a higher likelihood of misreporting. If a firm discloses 
ICWs before any restatement, it may well signal a potential accounting failure. In this case, the 
documented misreporting effect in the misreporting period may stem from ICW disclosures 
rather than employees having inside information about misreporting. To test whether employees 
have information beyond what can be inferred from ICW disclosures, we conduct two analyses 
by (1) adding an indicator variable (ICW) to the regression and (2) interacting ICW with 
Misreporting and PostRestatement. We obtain ICW data from Audit Analytics and set the value 
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of ICW to one if a misreporting firm discloses ICWs and zero otherwise. We identify 158 ICW 
disclosures for 2,068 firm-year observations. The rate of 7.64 percent is consistent with prior 
research that also documents a low rate of reported ICWs among firms with concurrent 
misstatements especially in more recent years (e.g., DeFond and Lennox 2017). Untabulated 
results indicate that controlling for ICW disclosures has little impact on Misreporting and 
PostRestatement. We report the interaction analysis results in Panel G of Table 5. While the 
coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement remain positive and significant, we fail to 
observe significant coefficients on the two interaction terms, suggesting that the ICW disclosure 
effect does not subsume the misreporting (restatement) effect. The overall results suggest that 
employees make investment decisions based on information not confined to ICW disclosures.      
Matched Sample Analysis 
In our main regression analyses, we include industry and year fixed effects to account for 
the industry heterogeneity and time-series trend in employee turnover. However, unobservable 
time-series changes contemporaneous with misreporting could also affect the estimated influence 
of misreporting and restatement. To address this concern, we create a matched control sample for 
the misreporting sample and then use difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation to remove the 
effect of contemporaneous shocks.  
We follow prior studies (e.g., Kedia and Philippon 2009; Desai et al. 2006) and create a 
matched control sample based on firm size, industry, and age. Specifically, for each misreporting 
firm, we first identify potential control firms in the same year and industry (2-digit SIC code) 
with firm age difference less than 5 percent.14 Among these firms, we then choose at most three 
                                                            
14 As pointed out by Desai et al. (2006), firm age is an important factor for accounting misreporting. First, the SEC 
is more likely to scrutinize young growth firms (Beneish 1999). Second, young firms have greater incentive to 
manipulate earnings, as they tend to seek external financing more frequently.  
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firms whose sizes are closest to the misreporting firm. This matching yields a total matched 
sample of 4,139 observations. 
For DiD estimation, we modify Equation (1) by adding an indicator variable ResFirm 
(equal to one for the misreporting firms and zero for the control firms), and the interaction terms 
with Misreporting and PostRestatement. The coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement 
represent changes in employee turnover for the control firms in the misreporting period and the 
post-restatement period. The coefficients on the two interaction terms (ResFirm*Misreporting 
and ResFirm*PostRestatement) are DiD estimators, capturing incremental increases in employee 
turnover for misreporting firms relative to matched control firms in the misreporting and post-
restatement period. We report the estimated results in Panel H of Table 5 and find that 
misreporting firms register a significantly incremental change in employee turnover in both the 
misreporting period and the post-restatement period.   
IV. FINANCIAL MISREPORTING AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP  
Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample selection for employee ownership analysis begins with 8,620 non-reliance 
restatements with filing year (fiscal year) between 2004 and 2015 in Audit Analytics for firms 
that are also covered by Compustat. We exclude restatements whose misreporting beginning date 
is less than five year after the ending date of a previous misstatement and are left with 4,486 
cases of restatement. The sample further reduces to 2,394 restatements after requiring the 
availability of data on main control variables (dividend-to-price, price-to-earnings, firm size, 
leverage, market-to-book, return on assets, capital expenditure, sales growth, firm age, and stock 
return) from Compustat and CRSP. We collect the dollar value of company stock held in 
employee retirement plans from Form 5500 Schedule H filings of employee retirement plans on 
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the website of the Department of Labor.15 We retain 772 restating firms that have the data. We 
further require restating firms to have at least one observation in each of the three periods, which 
leads to 354 restatements with 1,904 firm-year observations (841 observations in the pre-
misreporting period, 709 in the misreporting period, and 354 in the post-restatement period).  
Measuring Employee Holding of Employer Stock 
Following Bova et al. (2015) and Bova et al. (2014), we measure employee holding of 
employer stock (Employer_Stock) as the dollar value of employer stock held (item 1d1 of Form 
5500) in four defined contribution plans that allow direct investment in employer stock divided 
by the number of employees (item EMP from Compustat). Specifically, we include employee 
stock ownership plans, 401k plans, deferred profit-sharing plans invested in employer stock, and 
employer stock bonus plans. We aggregate stockholdings across these four employee ownership 
plans for a given firm in a year and merge the data with Compustat by the business entity's 
Employer Identification Number (EIN).  
Regression Model and Descriptive Statistics 
As in employee turnover analyses, we use the following within-sample temporal change 
design to estimate the effect of misreporting (restatement) on employee holding of employer 
stock: 
Log(1+Employer_Stockt ) = β0 + β1*Misreportingt + β2*PostRestatement t 
                                                               + β3*Stock_Matcht + β4*Dividend-to-Pricet-1  
                                                + β5*Price-to-Earningst-1 + β6*SIZEt-1 + β7*Leveraget -1 
                                                                        + β8*MTBt-1 + β9*ROAt-1 + β10*R&Dt-1 + β11*Capext-1  
                                                + β12*SalesGrowtht-1 + β13*Log(AGEt) + β14*StockReturnt-1  
                                                + β15*StockReturnt + Industry fixed effects  
                                                + Year fixed effects + ϵt.                                                                                  (2) 
 
                                                            
15 The website can be accessed at: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/public-
disclosure/foia/form-5500-datasets. 
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Due to right skewness in the data, we take the logarithm of one plus Employer_Stock as 
the dependent variable. If employees react to misreporting by reducing their holding of employer 
stock, we expect β1 to be negative and significant. As well, if employees react to restatement 
announcement, we expect the same for β2.  
We control for stock contribution (Stock_Match), as some employee holding of company 
stock result directly from employers' plan contributions in the form of company stock 
(Meulbroek 2005). An endorsement effect may also lead employees to invest more of their 
retirement savings to employer stocks as they interpret the form of employers' contributions as 
implicit investment advice (Benartzi 2001). We also include two value multiples as controls: 
dividend to price ratio (dividend_to_price) and price to earnings ratio (price_to_earnings). In 
addition, we include in the regression a set of firm characteristics that may affect employee 
holding of employer stock. We control for firm size (SIZE) and firm age (AGE), as employees 
are more likely to hold less risky securities in their retirement plans. We include leverage ratio 
(Leverage) to account for the effect of financial structure, and return on assets (ROA) and 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) to account for the effect of firm performance and growth 
opportunities. We also include R&D expenditure (R&D), capital investment (Capex), and sales 
growth (SalesGrowth) to account for the stage of firm life cycle. We further include past and 
current year stock returns (StockReturn) because stock market performance can affect employees' 
decision to hold company stocks. Lastly, we include industry fixed effects to account for industry 
heterogeneity and year fixed effects to account for the effect of changing macroeconomic 
situation. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles and adjust all 
standard errors for clustering at the firm level.      
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Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in Equation (2). The mean 
(median) value of equity in employer stock held per employee is $6,641 (1,148), which is 
comparable to prior studies (e.g., Bova et al. 2014; Bova et al. 2015; Phua et al. 2018). Panel B 
of Figure 1 plots the mean value of employer_stock in the three periods which is $7,125 in the 
pre-misreporting period and down to $6,326 and $6,125 in the misreporting and post-restatement 
period, respectively. The mean value of Misreporting and PostStatement indicates that the 
number of observations in the misreporting and post-restatement period accounts for 37.2 and 
18.6 percent of total observations, respectively. Roughly 2.3 percent of firms match their 
contributions in the form of company stock. The average sample firm has dividend to price ratio 
of 1.3 percent and price to earnings ratio of 14. Average firm size is 6.841, leverage ratio 0.237, 
market-to-book ratio 1.715, return on assets -0.008, the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets 
0.036, the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets 0.045, annual sales growth rate 0.106, firm 
age 27.543, and annual stock return 0.032. 
Empirical Results 
The coefficient estimates from Equation (2) are reported in Table 7. As expected, we find 
a negative and significant coefficients on Misreporting (coef. = -0.362; p-value = 0.020). As the 
dependent variable is logarithm transformed, this coefficient means that the average employee 
holding of employer stock during the misreporting period is 69.6% (exp[-0.362] = 0.696) of the 
average employee ownership in the pre-misreporting period. The coefficient on PostRestatement 
is also negative and significant (coef. = -0.1.071; p-value = 0.000), and this implies that the 
average employee ownership in the post-restatement period is 34.3% of that in the pre-
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misreporting period. The results suggest that employees start to offload employer stock in the 
misreporting period and do it even further after restatement announcement.16   
With respect to the control variables, we find that employees in large and mature 
companies are more likely to hold employer stock in their retirement plans, consistent with 
Meulbroek (2005). Also, stock contribution is positively related to employee holding of 
employer stock. In addition, employees seem to avoid employer stock in companies with high 
R&D and sales growth, suggesting that employees prefer safe securities to high growth stocks in 
their retirement plans. We further find that current year stock return is positively related to 
Employer_Stock. This can be due to employees' holding of employer stock with superior return 
and/or a mechanical relation between the value of employer stock held by employees and stock 
price. In robustness checks, we conduct two tests to ensure that the relation between employee 
holding of employer stock and misreporting (restatement) is not driven by declining stock prices. 
We also examine whether the severe types of misreporting induce a greater reduction in 
employee holding of employer stock.  We add to Equation (2) SevereRes and its two interaction 
terms with Misreporting and PostRestatement and report the estimated results in Table 8. The 
coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement remain negative and significant, suggesting 
that employees react to all types of misreporting by reducing their ownership. As in the 
employee turnover analysis, we find that employee ownership is sensitive to more severe 
misreporting only after the restatement announcement, suggesting that public announcements 
provide additional and substantive information to employees.  
 
                                                            
16 When use Employer_Stock rather than its logarithm transformation as the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
Misreporting is 1,375 (p-value = 0.013) and the coefficient on PostRestatement is 1,451 (p-value = 0.041). 
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We next perform a subsample analysis to inquire whether employee tenure with the firm 
affects the association between employee ownership and misreporting during the misreporting 
period. We partition the sample into two subsamples based on firm age and estimate Equation (2) 
separately for the two subsamples. As reported in Table 9, the coefficient on Misreporting is 
only significant for the long tenure subsample, and the magnitude of coefficient more than 
double that for the short tenure subsample although the difference is not significant. The 
coefficient on PostRestatement is similar for both two subsamples. The overall results suggest 
that long tenure with the firm provides employees information advantages during the 
misreporting period, but has little effect after misreporting is publicly exposed.    
Robustness Checks 
Stock Price Effect 
To examine whether the documented relation between the value of employee ownership 
and misreporting (restatement) simply reflects the declining stock price effect, we also conduct 
two tests as in the turnover analysis. First, we exclude restatements that were announced during 
the 2007 financial crisis (2007-2009). As reported in Panel A of Table 10, the coefficients on 
Misreporting and PostRestatement remain negative and significant, suggesting that the 
documented misreporting and restatement effect is not due to market-wide shock to stock prices.  
Second, we examine whether the misreporting (restatement) effect on employee holding 
of employer stock depends on stock price. We interact LowStockPrc with Misreporting and 
PostRestatement. As reported in Panel B of Table 10, the coefficients on the two interaction 
terms are not negatively significant, suggesting that the reduced employee holding of employer 
stock in the misreporting and post-restatement period is not a reflection of declining stock prices. 
Internal Control Weakness Disclosure 
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To examine whether ICW disclosures affect the misreporting effect and restatement 
effect on employee holding of employer stock, we conduct two tests by (1) adding ICW to the 
regression and (2) interacting ICW with Misreporting and PostRestatement. Untabulated results 
indicate that after controlling for ICW disclosures, the coefficients on Misreporting and 
PostRestatement remain largely unchanged. We report the second test results in Panel C of Table 
10. The coefficient on the two interaction terms are not statistically significant. The results 
suggest that ICW disclosures have little impact on the misreporting and restatement effects.  
Matched Sample Analysis 
We use the same method as in the employee turnover analysis to create a matched control 
sample and estimate a DiD regression for employee holdings of employer stock. As reported in 
Panel D of Table 10, misreporting firms register a significantly incremental change in employee 
ownership relative to the control firms only in the post-restatement period.  
6. Conclusion 
Employees are internal stakeholders who tie up their human capital with the firm and thus 
bear substantial costs for firm accounting failures by potentially losing their jobs and retirement 
wealth. Yet, little is known about whether and how they respond to the firm's financial 
misreporting in general. Our study fills this gap by investigating whether financial misreporting 
induces an increase in employee turnover and a decrease in employee holding of employer stock 
in the period before the misreporting is uncovered to the public and the period following the 
restatement announcement. This inquiry is important as both increased employee turnover and 
decreased employee ownership impose significant costs on misreporting firms.   
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Using within-sample analyses, we find that misreporting firms experience an increase of 
13.04 percent in employee turnover in the misreporting period and of 29.75 percent in the post-
restatement period, relative to the pre-misreporting period. The effect of misreporting and 
restatement on employee turnover is incremental to what can be explained by changing firm 
characteristics, changing firm behavior that may alter labor demand, and industry and time (year) 
trend. We also find some evidence that more severe misreporting induces greater employee 
turnover in the post-restatement period although we do not find it in the misreporting period, and 
that only employees having long tenure with the firm react to misreporting before it is revealed 
publicly. A battery of robustness tests indicate that the misreporting (restatement) effect on 
employee turnover (1) is not subsumed by the labor demand effect, (2) is not an artifact of 
increased likelihood of CEO turnover around the restatement announcement, (3) is not the result 
of declining stock prices, (4) is not driven by the information confined in ICW disclosures in the 
misreporting period, and (5) is robust to the matched sample estimation.  
As another employee reaction, we find that employees reduce holding of company stock 
in their retirement plans after the restatement announcement and some evidence that they start to 
do so even when the misreporting is in progress. Similarly, we find that the severity of 
misreporting matters for employee ownership only in the post-restatement period and that long 
employee tenure matters in the misreporting period. We conduct a slew of robustness checks as 
well. In sum, we provide evidence of substantial human capital costs of financial misreporting to 
misreporting firms, shedding new light on the negative consequences of accounting failures.  
32 
 
REFERENCES 
Amel-Zadeh, A., Zhang, Y., 2015. The economic consequences of financial restatements: 
Evidence from the market for corporate control. The Accounting Review 90, 1-29. 
Anderson, K.L., Yohn, T.L., 2002. The effect of 10K restatements on firm value, information 
asymmetries, and investors' reliance on earnings. Working paper: Georgetown 
University. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=332380 
Babenko, I., Sen, R., 2014. Money left on the table: An analysis of participation in employee 
stock purchase plans. Review of Financial Studies 27, 3658-3698. 
Baily, M.N., 1974. Wages and employment under uncertain demand. The Review of Economic 
Studies 41, 37-50. 
Benartzi, S., 2001. Excessive extrapolation and the allocation of 401 (k) accounts to company 
stock. The Journal of Finance 56, 1747-1764. 
Benartzi, S., Thaler, R.H., Utkus, S.P., Sunstein, C.R., 2007. The law and economics of company 
stock in 401 (k) plans. The Journal of Law and Economics 50, 45-79. 
Beneish, M.D., 1999. The detection of earnings manipulation. Financial Analysts Journal 55, 24-
36. 
Bova, F., Dou, Y., Hope, O.K., 2015. Employee ownership and firm disclosure. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 32, 639-673. 
Bova, F., Kolev, K., Thomas, J.K., Zhang, X.F., 2014. Non-executive employee ownership and 
corporate risk. The Accounting Review 90, 115-145. 
Bowen, R.M., DuCharme, L., Shores, D., 1995. Stakeholders' implicit claims and accounting 
method choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20, 255-295. 
Call, A.C., Kedia, S., Rajgopal, S., 2016. Rank and file employees and the discovery of 
misreporting: The role of stock options. Journal of Accounting and Economics 62, 277-
300. 
Carpenter, J.N., Stanton, R., Wallace, N., 2019. Employee Stock Option Exercise and Firm Cost. 
The Journal of Finance 74, 1175-1216. 
Carter, M.E., Lynch, L.J., 2004. The effect of stock option repricing on employee turnover. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 91-112. 
Chemmanur, T.J., Cheng, Y., Zhang, T., 2013. Human capital, capital structure, and employee 
pay: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 110, 478-502. 
Chen, P.-C., 2016. Banks' acquisition of private information about financial misreporting. The 
Accounting Review 91, 835-857. 
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Lo, A.K., 2013. Is the decline in the information content of earnings 
following restatements short-lived? The Accounting Review 89, 177-207. 
Cornell, B., Shapiro, A.C., 1987. Corporate stakeholders and corporate finance. Financial 
Management, 5-14. 
David, G., Brachet, T., 2011. On the determinants of organizational forgetting. American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3, 100-123. 
DeFond, M.L., Lennox, C.S., 2017. Do PCAOB inspections improve the quality of internal 
control audits? Journal of Accounting Research 55, 591-627. 
33 
 
Desai, H., Hogan, C.E., Wilkins, M.S., 2006. The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting: 
Earnings restatements and management turnover. The Accounting Review 81, 83-112. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L., 2010. Who blows the whistle on corporate fraud? The Journal 
of Finance 65, 2213-2253. 
Graham, J.R., Li, S., Qiu, J., 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of 
Financial Economics 89, 44-61. 
Guiso, L., Pistaferri, L., Schivardi, F., 2005. Insurance within the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 113, 1054-1087. 
Huddart, S., Lang, M., 1996. Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 21, 5-43. 
Hamermesh, D.S., Wolfe, J.R., 1990. Compensating wage differentials and the duration of wage 
loss. Journal of Labor Economics 8, S175-S197. 
Hennes, K.M., Leone, A.J., Miller, B.P., 2008. The importance of distinguishing errors from 
irregularities in restatement research: The case of restatements and CEO/CFO turnover. 
The Accounting Review 83, 1487-1519. 
Hribar, P., Jenkins, N.T., 2004. The effect of accounting restatements on earnings revisions and 
the estimated cost of capital. Review of Accounting Studies 9, 337-356. 
Jovanovic, B., 1979. Job matching and the theory of turnover. Journal of Political Economy 87, 
972-990. 
Karpoff, J.M., Lee, D.S., Martin, G.S., 2008a. The cost to firms of cooking the books. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, 581-611. 
Karpoff, J.M., Lee, D.S., Martin, G.S., 2008b. The consequences to managers for financial 
misrepresentation. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 193-215. 
Kedia, S., Philippon, T., 2009. The economics of fraudulent accounting. Review of Financial 
Studies 22, 2169-2199. 
Kruse, D., Blasi, J., 1995. Employee ownership, employee attitudes, and firm performance. 
Working paper: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lane, J.I., Isaac, A.G., Stevens, D.W., 1996. Firm heterogeneity and worker turnover. Review of 
Industrial Organization 11, 275-291. 
Meulbroek, L., 2005. Company stock in pension plans: How costly is it? The Journal of Law and 
Economics 48, 443-474. 
McNichols, M.F., Stubben, S.R., 2008. Does earnings management affect firms’ investment 
decisions? The Accounting Review 83, 1571-1603. 
Ouimet, P., Zarutskie, R., 2014. Who works for startups? The relation between firm age, 
employee age, and growth. Journal of Financial Economics 112, 386-407. 
Palmrose, Z.-V., Richardson, V.J., Scholz, S., 2004. Determinants of market reactions to 
restatement announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 59-89. 
Palmrose, Z.-V., Scholz, S., 2004. The circumstances and legal consequences of non-GAAP 
reporting: Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research 21, 139-180. 
Phua, K., Tham, T.M., Wei, C., 2018. Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from 
stakeholder commitments. Journal of Financial Economics 127, 519-545. 
34 
 
Rauh, J.D., 2006. Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate 
pension plans. The Journal of Finance 61, 33-71. 
Schrand, C.M., Zechman, S.L., 2012. Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to 
financial misreporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53, 311-329. 
Serfling, M., 2016. Firing costs and capital structure decisions. The Journal of Finance 71, 2239-
2286. 
Srinivasan, S., 2005. Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence 
from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of Accounting 
Research 43, 291-334. 
Topel, R.H., 1984. Equilibrium earnings, turnover, and unemployment: New evidence. Journal 
of Labor Economics 2, 500-522. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
Appendix 1 
Variable definitions 
Misreporting variables. Source: Audit Analytics. 
Misreporting 
PostRestatement 
 
SevereRes 
= 
= 
 
= 
1 if a firm-year is in the misreporting period and 0 otherwise. 
1 if a firm-year is in the post-restatement period (one year after the 
restatement announcement) and 0 otherwise. 
1 if a misstatement is identified by Audit Analytics as fraud or being 
investigated by the SEC. 
Employee turnover variable. Source: Compustat and ExecuComp.  
EmployeeTurnover = options forfeiture rate estimated as the number of stock options cancellations, 
forfeitures, and expirations (OPTCA from Compustat since 2004) divided by 
the number of non-executive employee stock options outstanding (i.e., the 
difference between total number of stock options outstanding [OPTOSEY 
from Compustat] and sum of the number of exercisable and non-exercisable 
executive stock options outstanding [OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM + 
OPT_UNEX_UNEXER_NUM from ExecuComp]) in the beginning of the 
year.  
Firm-specific characteristics for analyses of employee turnover. Source: Compustat and CRSP. 
SIZE  = firm size estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets (AT).  
Leverage = leverage ratio calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) plus short-term debt 
(DLC) divided by total assets (AT). 
MTB = market-to-book ratio estimated as total assets (AT) minus book value of 
equity (CEQ) plus market value of equity (PRCC*CSHO) divided by total 
assets.  
ROA = 
 
return on assets estimated as earnings before extraordinary items (IB) divided 
by total assets (AT).  
R&D = R&D expenditure estimated as R&D expense (XRD) divided by total assets 
(AT).  
Capex = capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by total assets (AT). 
SalesGrowth = sales growth estimated as sales in current year (SALE) minus sales in the 
previous year divided by sales in the previous year. 
AGE 
StockReturn 
 
= 
= 
 
firm age since the firm first appears in Compustat.    
buy-and-hold monthly return over the current year minus the buy-and-hold of 
the value-weighted market index. 
EmployeeGrowth = change in the number of employee (EMPt - EMPt-1) scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the year (ATt-1). 
AssetGrowth  = change in total assets (AT). 
PPENTGrowth = change in property, plant, and equipment (PPENT). 
ExeTurnover = 1 if a firm has CEO or CFO turnover and 0 otherwise.  
ICW = 1 if a firm discloses internal control weakness during the misreporting period 
and 0 otherwise. 
LowStockPrc = 1 if the current year stock return is below the median value and 0 otherwise. 
ResFirm = 1 for misreporting firms and 0 for matched control firms. 
 
Additional variables for analyses of employee holding of employer stock. Source: Compustat and 
Form 5500 Schedule H filings of employee retirement plans on the website of the Department of 
Labor.  
Employer_Stock = dollar value of employer stock holding per employee estimated as the dollar 
value of employer stock held (item 1d1 of Form 5500) divided by the number 
of active plan participants (item 6a2 of Form 5500).  
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Stock_Match = 1 if employer matches its contribution with company stock and 0 otherwise. 
Dividend_to_Price = Dividend to price ratio estimated as dividend (DVC) divided by market value 
of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO). 
Price_to_Earnings = Price to earnings ratio estimated as market value of equity (PRCC_F* CSHO) 
divided by earnings before extraordinary items (IBC).  
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Figure 1 
Panel A: Employee turnover rate in the pre-misreporting, misreporting, and post-
restatement periods 
 
 
 
Panel B: Employee holding of employer stock in the pre-misreporting, misreporting, and 
post-restatement periods 
 
 
 
The misreporting period is defined as fiscal years in which a firm misreports its financial statements (based on the 
start and end dates of misreporting in Audit Analytics). The pre-misreporting period is defined as the three years 
preceding the start year of the misreporting period. The post-restatement period is defined as the year after the 
restatement announcement.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of employee turnover and validation of employee turnover 
measure 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
EmployeeTurnovert 0.131 0.196 0.023 0.062 0.151 
Misreportingt 0.354 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PostRestatementt 0.177 0.382 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZEt-1  7.733 1.569 6.628 7.648 8.804 
Leveraget-1 0.232 0.183 0.082 0.212 0.347 
MTBt-1 1.762 1.001 1.120 1.440 1.993 
ROAt-1 0.034 0.091 0.010 0.043 0.077 
R&Dt-1 0.025 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.028 
Capext-1 0.043 0.046 0.014 0.030 0.055 
SalesGrowtht-1 0.083 0.219 -0.024 0.067 0.165 
AGEt-1 27.187 17.045 14.000 21.000 
40.00
0 
StockReturnt-1 0.033 0.380 -0.199 -0.016 0.195 
StockReturnt 0.026 0.384 -0.205 -0.020 0.184 
SalesGrowtht 0.070 0.209 -0.033 0.055 0.150 
EmployeeGrowtht 0.015 0.092 -0.009 0.002 0.025 
AssetGrowtht 0.085 0.230 -0.022 0.046 0.127 
PPENTGrowtht 0.086 0.268 -0.040 0.032 0.131 
      Panel B:  Correlations of employee turnover measure with employee growth and stock 
return 
  ΔEMPt/Att-1 ΔEMPt/EMPt-1 ΔEMPt/PPENTt-1 StockReturnt   
EmployeeTurnovert -0.139 -0.157 -0.121 -0.012 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.572   
Panel A of the table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses of employee turnover for a 
sample of 2,109 firm-year observations from 374 distinct misreporting firms that filed restatements between fiscal 
year 2007 and 2015. Panel B presents the correlations between the measure of employee turnover and measures of 
employment growth and current year stock return. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers.  See variable definitions in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2 
Financial misreporting and employee turnover 
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.358*** 0.000 
Misreportingt 0.013* 0.081 
PostRestatementt 0.034** 0.029 
SIZEt-1 -0.026*** 0.000 
Leveraget-1 0.102** 0.049 
MTBt-1 -0.019*** 0.005 
ROAt-1 -0.335*** 0.001 
R&Dt-1 0.071 0.643 
Capext-1 -0.249* 0.055 
SalesGrowtht-1 -0.047** 0.034 
AGEt-1 0.003 0.763 
StockReturnt-1 -0.054*** 0.000 
StockReturnt -0.026* 0.053 
SalesGrowtht -0.052** 0.020 
EmployeeGrowtht -0.095 0.125 
AssetGrowtht -0.025 0.319 
PPENTGrowtht -0.002 0.913 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 2,109 
R2 22.65% 
This table presents the OLS estimations of our primary model of employee turnover. Industry fixed effects are based 
on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on a one-sided 
test for the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement and a two-sided test for the other variables, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
Financial misreporting and employee turnover—severity of misreporting 
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.320*** 0.000 
Misreportingt 0.014* 0.077 
PostRestatementt 0.031** 0.041 
SevereRest 0.030 0.586 
SevereRest*Misreportingt -0.010 0.418 
SevereRest*PostRestatementt 0.106* 0.097 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 2,109 
R2 23.12% 
This table presents OLS estimations of employee turnover on a varying degree of severity of misreporting. Industry 
fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are based on 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting, PostRestatement, SevereRes*Misreporting, and 
SevereRes*PostRestatement and a two-sided test for the other variables, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Financial misreporting and employee turnover—employee tenure 
  Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert     
 
Long Employee Tenure Short Employee Tenure 
 Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Difference P-value 
Intercept 0.308*** 0.001 0.172 0.122 
  Misreportingt 0.026** 0.021 -0.003 0.424 0.029 0.072 
PostRestatementt 0.037** 0.035 0.035 0.110 0.002 0.952 
Control variables Yes Yes 
  Industry FE Yes Yes 
  Year FE Yes Yes 
  N 1,090 1,019 
  R2 34.08% 23.97%     
This table presents OLS estimations of employee turnover for two subsamples partitioned by employee tenure. A 
firm falls into the long (short) employee tenure subsample if firm age is above (equal or below) the median value.  
Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are 
based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement and a two-sided test 
for the other variables, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Financial misreporting and employee turnover—robustness checks 
Panel A: Firing cost 
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
 
High Firing Cost Low Firing Cost 
Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.375*** 0.000 0.270*** 0.003 
Misreportingt 0.014 0.122 0.014 0.206 
PostRestatementt 0.039** 0.032 0.017 0.293 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 1,543 551 
R2 25.23% 29.10% 
     Panel B: Employee bargaining power 
  Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
 
High Power Low Power 
Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.482*** 0.000 0.353*** 0.000 
Misreportingt 0.020* 0.057 0.000 0.500 
PostRestatementt 0.038* 0.051 0.040* 0.079 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 901 899 
R2 22.13% 27.16% 
     Panel C: Restructuring 
    Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
 
Restructuring No Restructuring 
Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.376*** 0.000 0.303*** 0.000 
Misreportingt 0.001 0.487 0.022** 0.023 
PostRestatementt 0.020 0.273 0.056*** 0.002 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N 984 1,110 
R2 28.89% 26.68 
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Panel D: Executive turnover 
    Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable   Coef. P-value   
Intercept 
 
0.332*** 0.000 
 Misreportingt 
 
0.015* 0.059 
 PostRestatementt 
 
0.027* 0.066 
 ExeTurnovert 
 
0.058*** 0.000 
 ExeTurnovert*Misreportingt 
 
-0.008 0.357 
 ExeTurnovert*PostRestatementt 
 
0.022 0.224 
 Control variables 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 Year FE 
 
Yes 
 N 
 
2,109 
 R2   24.22%   
     Panel E: Excluding restatements announced during 2007 financial crisis 
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable   Coef. P-value   
Intercept 
 
0.340*** 0.000 
 Misreportingt 
 
0.015* 0.097 
 PostRestatementt 
 
0.033* 0.072 
 Control variables 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 Year FE 
 
Yes 
 N 
 
1,890 
 R2   23.57%   
     Panel F: Interacting with stock prices 
  
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable   Coef. P-value   
Intercept 
 
0.363*** 0.000 
 Misreportingt 
 
0.010 0.202 
 PostRestatementt 
 
0.050** 0.014 
 LowStockPrc 
 
0.018* 0.088 
 LowStockPrc*Misreportingt 
 
-0.006 0.360 
 LowStockPrc*PostRestatementt 
 
0.032* 0.097 
 Control variables 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 Year FE 
 
Yes 
 N 
 
2,109 
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R2   22.81%   
     Panel G: Internal control disclosure 
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable   Coef. P-value   
Intercept 
 
0.356*** 0.000 
 Misreportingt 
 
0.015* 0.063 
 PostRestatementt 
 
0.027* 0.084 
 ICW 
 
-0.003 0.892 
 ICW*Misreportingt 
 
-0.018 0.281 
 ICW*PostRestatementt 
 
0.036 0.161 
 Control variables 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 Year FE 
 
Yes 
 N 
 
2,068 
 R2   22.68%   
     Panel H: Matched sample analysis 
  
 
Dependent variable = EmployeeTurnovert 
Variable   Coef. P-value   
Intercept 
 
0.284*** 0.000 
 Misreportingt 
 
0.002 0.383 
 PostRestatementt 
 
0.007 0.298 
 ResFirm 
 
0.002 0.822 
 ResFirm*Misreportingt 
 
0.015* 0.086 
 ResFirm*PostRestatementt 
 
0.036** 0.016 
 Control variables 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE 
 
Yes 
 Year FE 
 
Yes 
 N 
 
4,139 
 R2   20.67%   
Panel A presents a subsample analysis of employee turnover partitioned by firing costs. Firing costs, based on state-
level recognition of wrongful discharge laws (WDLs), is the summation of three distinct dummy variables for each 
of the three WDL exceptions (the good faith exception, the implied contract exception, and the public policy 
exception). Panel B present a subsample analysis partitioned by employee bargain power. Employee bargain power 
is measured by industry unionization, which is collected from the Union Membership and Coverage Database 
(UMCD). Panel C presents a subsample analysis based on business restructuring. A firm experiences restructuring if 
item rcp or rca from Computat is nonzero. Panel D presents OLS estimations controlling for the effect of executive 
turnover. Panel E presents OLS estimations for a sample excluding the misstatements announced during the 2007 
financial crisis (2007-2009). Panel F presents OLS estimations controlling for the effect of stock price. Panel G 
presents OLS estimations controlling for the effect of internal control weakness disclosures. Panel H presents a 
matched sample analysis while the matched sample is created based on industry-, size-, and firm age-match. 
Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are 
based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
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10% levels based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting, PostRestatement, 
ExeTurnover*Misreporting, ExeTurnover*PosRestatement, ICW*Misreporting, ICW*PosRestatement, LowStockPrc 
*Misreporting, LowStockPrc*PosRestatement,  ResFirm*Misreporting, and ResFirm*PostRestatement and a two-
sided test for the other variables, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for the sample of employee holding of employer stock 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25% Median 75% 
Employer_Stockt 6,641 12,903 0 1,148 7,195 
Misreportingt 0.372 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PostRestatementt 0.186 0.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Stock_Matcht 0.023 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dividend_to_Pricet-1 0.013 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.021 
Price_to_Earningst-1 13.797 50.458 -1.034 15.012 23.643 
SIZEt-1  6.841 1.909 5.462 6.830 8.139 
Leveraget-1 0.237 0.203 0.065 0.209 0.354 
MTBt-1 1.715 1.054 1.080 1.362 1.944 
ROAt-1 -0.008 0.169 -0.006 0.025 0.061 
R&Dt-1 0.036 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.030 
Capext-1 0.045 0.051 0.012 0.031 0.056 
SalesGrowtht-1 0.106 0.317 -0.037 0.064 0.178 
AGEt-1 24.543 16.924 11.000 19.000 37.000 
StockReturnt-1 0.072 0.526 -0.229 -0.027 0.240 
StockReturnt 0.032 0.486 -0.248 -0.042 0.204 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses of employee holding of employer stock 
for a sample of 1,904 firm-year observations from 354 distinct misreporting firms that filed restatements between 
fiscal year 2004 and 2015. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
influence of outliers.  See variable definitions in Appendix 1. 
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Table 7 
Financial misreporting and employee holding of employer stock 
 
Dependent variable =Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.258 0.881 
Misreportingt -0.362** 0.020 
PostRestatementt -1.071*** 0.000 
Stock_Matcht 2.480*** 0.000 
Dividend_to_Pricet-1 -1.555 0.857 
Price_to_Earningst-1 0.003** 0.025 
SIZEt-1  0.452*** 0.000 
Leveraget-1 0.381 0.642 
MTBt-1 0.176 0.303 
ROAt-1 0.223 0.786 
R&Dt-1 -4.826* 0.088 
Capext-1 -0.766 0.842 
SalesGrowtht-1 -0.490** 0.033 
Log(AGEt-1) 0.583* 0.081 
StockReturnt-1 0.043 0.786 
StockReturnt 0.503*** 0.002 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 1,904 
R2 47.21% 
This table presents the OLS estimations of our primary model of employee holding of employer stock. Industry 
fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are based on 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement and a two-sided test for the other 
variables, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Financial misreporting and employee holding of employer stock—severity of misreporting 
 
Dependent variable =Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.362 0.834 
Misreportingt -0.343** 0.049 
PostRestatementt -0.960*** 0.000 
SevereRest 0.225 0.561 
SevereRest*Misreportingt -0.080 0.382 
SevereRest*PostRestatementt -0.351* 0.098 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 1,904 
R2 47.24% 
This table presents OLS estimations of employee holding of employer stock on a varying degree of severity of 
misreporting. Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-
values are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting, PostRestatement, 
SevereRes*Misreporting, and SevereRes*PostRestatement and a two-sided test for the other variables, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Financial misreporting and employee holding of employer stock—employee tenure 
  Dependent variable =Log(Employer_Stockt)     
 
Long Employee Tenure Short Employee Tenure 
 Variable Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Difference P-value 
Intercept 7.663*** 0.009 -4.883 0.162 
  Misreportingt -0.494** 0.015 -0.235 0.161 -0.259 0.218 
PostRestatementt -1.151*** 0.000 -0.739** 0.017 -0.412 0.191 
Control variables Yes Yes 
  Industry FE Yes Yes 
  Year FE Yes Yes 
  N 964 940 
  R2 52.57% 48.43%     
This table presents OLS estimations of employee holding of employer stock for two subsamples partitioned by 
employee tenure. A firm falls into the long (short) employee tenure subsample if firm age is above (equal or below) 
the median value.  Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. See variable definitions in Appendix 
1. p-values are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on Misreporting and PostRestatement and a 
two-sided test for the other variables, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Financial misreporting and employee holding of employer stock—robustness checks 
Panel A: Excluding restatements announced during the 2007 financial crisis 
 
Dependent variable = Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.383 0.827 
Misreportingt -0.322** 0.044 
PostRestatementt -0.888*** 0.001 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 1,451 
R2 49.98% 
   Panel B: Interacting with stock return 
 
Dependent variable = Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.537 0.759 
Misreportingt -0.150 0.253 
PostRestatementt -0.843*** 0.003 
LowStockRet -0.818*** 0.000 
LowStockRet*Misreportingt 0.440* 0.072 
LowStockRet*PostRestatementt 0.507 0.108 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 1,904 
R2 47.39% 
   Panel C: Internal control disclosure 
 
Dependent variable = Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.302 0.865 
Misreportingt -0.409** 0.014 
PostRestatementt -1.078*** 0.000 
ICW -0.583 0.373 
ICW*Misreportingt 0.888 0.107 
ICW*PostRestatementt 0.540 0.257 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
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N 1,749 
R2 46.45% 
   Panel D: Match sample analysis 
 
Dependent variable = Log(Employer_Stockt) 
Variable Coef. P-value 
Intercept 0.383 0.775 
Misreportingt -0.734*** 0.000 
PostRestatementt -0.913*** 0.000 
ResFirm 0.246 0.356 
ResFirm*Misreportingt 0.228 0.106 
ResFirm*PostRestatementt -0.345* 0.042 
Control variables Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
N 4,137 
R2 46.74% 
Panel A presents OLS estimations of employee holding of employer stock for a sample of misreporting firms 
excluding the misstatements announced during the 2007 financial crisis (2007-2009). Panel B presents OLS 
estimations controlling for the effect of stock price. Panel C presents OLS estimations controlling for the effect of 
internal control weakness disclosures. Panel D presents a matched sample analysis while the matched sample is 
created based on industry-, size-, and firm age-match. Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code. 
See variable definitions in Appendix 1. p-values are based on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels based on a one-sided test for the coefficients on 
Misreporting, PostRestatement, ICW*Misreporting, ICW*PosRestatement, LowStockPrc*Misreporting, 
LowStockPrc*PosRestatement, ResFirm*Misreporting, and ResFirm*PostRestatement and a two-sided test for the 
other variables, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
